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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
recognizes that an accused has the right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him, thus implicitly limiting government power by 
restricting the admission of non-confronted hearsay against an 
accused.1  With Crawford v. Washington,2  the United States Supreme 
Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts,3
 
       †  Distinguished Visiting Professor and Practitioner, University of Minnesota 
Law School; Visiting Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law. The 
author wishes to thank Hans Grong for his inestimable help on this article. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
 2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 3. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 and discarded its twenty-four-year-
old “super-reliability” test for determining the constitutional 
propriety of admitting hearsay against an accused at a criminal 
1
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trial.4  Understanding the Confrontation Clause not as a substantive 
evidential guarantee but as a procedural right to a fair trial,5 the 
Crawford Court ruled that for hearsay to be admitted against a 
defendant in a criminal trial, the declarant must be unavailable and 
the hearsay must have been subjected to prior cross-examination.6  
This holding may be as close as the Court gets to establishing black 
letter law in criminal procedural cases,7 for unavailability and prior 
cross-examination is the only test, and it is a dispositive test.8
This return to 1791 and original meaning
 
9 occurred when the 
analytical framework of Ohio v. Roberts10 had crumbled and when 
Justices Scalia and Thomas had sufficiently explicated their 
Founders’ Theory of constitutional decision-making in this area.11
 
 4. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  This right was held applicable 
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that the Sixth Amendment’s right of an 
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and 
is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (2004) (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is 
to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee.”). 
 6. Id. at 59.  The Court has defined “confrontation” to mean cross-
examination.  See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).  See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (stating that the 
Confrontation Clause requires a “prior opportunity for cross-examination”). 
 7. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 486 (1966).  
 8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55–56 (“We do not read the historical sources to say 
that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a 
necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that 
this requirement was dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish 
reliability.”). 
 9. The Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791.  Id. at 46. 
 10. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  In the wake of Roberts, the Court interpreted the 
decision increasingly narrowly, indicating a retreat from its conceptual 
underpinnings.  See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (eschewing Roberts’ 
reliability analysis); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that introducing 
testimony without the opportunity for cross-examination is a paradigmatic 
violation of the Confrontation Clause); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56 
(1992) (holding that that the prosecution was not required to produce the four-
year-old victim of a sexual assault at trial or show the victim was unavailable before 
the out-of-court statements of the child could be admitted); id. at 362 n.1 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing Roberts on historical grounds; joined by 
Justice Scalia); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“Roberts cannot 
fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement 
can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable.”). 
  
 11. See White, 502 U.S. at 353–54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the 
2
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In short, the Crawford Court12 focused the Confrontation Clause 
problem addressed in 1791, articulated the solution that the Court 
concluded is the solution of 1791, and entrenched that solution in 
criminal practice today.13
But what exactly was the problem in 1791?  Not the admission 
of hearsay at a criminal trial, but the admission of “testimony” at a 
criminal trial.
 
14  The Sixth Amendment secures the right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against an accused, not the right to 
confront anyone who happens to have said something relevant.15  
That is, Crawford reasoned, the Sixth Amendment is primarily, if 
not solely, concerned with testimonial hearsay.16
En route to its holding that testimonial hearsay is categorically 
inadmissible in a criminal trial against a defendant unless the 
declarant is unavailable
 
17 and the testimony was subjected to prior18
 
conflict between the text of the clause and the historical cases in which it was 
originally interpreted; suggesting that the Court ought to revisit the “witness 
against” precedents in light of the historical understanding of the clause).  See also 
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring in the judgment based on 
the rationale set forth by Justice Thomas in White). 
 12. Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor concurred in the judgment, but would 
not have overruled Roberts.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (2004). 
 13. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (discussing “[o]ur 
Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches . . .”).  The common 
law tradition at issue in confrontation cases is that of “live testimony in court 
subject to adversarial testing.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 14.  “[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”  Id. 
at 51. Rather, the Sixth Amendment’s core concern is with specific types of out-of-
court statements: testimonial statements, which Crawford describes as ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent; extrajudicial statements contained in 
formalized testimonial materials; statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.  Id. at 51–52. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 17. The Court has yet to define what “unavailability” means for purposes of 
Crawford analysis.  What the Court has said is that unavailability under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 804(a) provides little insight into whether a witness is “available” for 
purposes of being subject to cross-examination under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(C).  United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564 (1988) (“Quite 
obviously, the two characterizations are made for two entirely different purposes 
and there is no requirement or expectation that they should coincide.”).  
Regardless of the characterization of unavailability, the Owens court held the 
admission of clearly testimonial hearsay from a declarant “unavailable” for Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804 purposes but subject to cross-examination for Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801 purposes did not violate the Confrontation Clause.  See id. 
 
 18. Crawford is adamant that the cross-examination be “prior” cross-
examination as opposed to prior statements subjected to cross-examination at 
trial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (“Our cases have thus remained faithful to the 
3
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cross-examination, the Court identified one possible exception to 
its categorical rule: dying declarations. 
The one deviation we have found involves dying 
declarations.  The existence of that exception as a general 
rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.  
Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, 
there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are.  
We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth 
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial 
dying declarations.  If this exception must be accepted on 
historical grounds, it is sui generis.19
This article asks why testimonial dying declarations might be 




There seem to be a few possible answers: (1) because dying 
declarations are so reliable that the Sixth Amendment’s concern 
that the reliability of testimonial statements be “tested in the 
crucible of cross-examination”
 
21 is not raised;22 (2) because dying 
declarations are self-confronted;23 (3) because no dying declaration 
can be testimonial (and thus does not present a Sixth Amendment 
problem);24 (4) because the Founders said so.25
Before considering these four possibilities, I will make a 
preliminary comment on dying declarations under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and offer a summary review of Crawford 
 
 
Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial 
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”); id. at 68 (“[T]he Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”).  A plain reading of Crawford demonstrates 
that the admission against an accused of an in-court witness’s prior testimonial 
hearsay statements, made at a time when the accused did not have the opportunity 
to confront those statements by cross-examination, would violate the Sixth 
Amendment even though the witness is presently available to be confronted about 
those prior statements. 
 19. Id. at 56 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 20. Nontestimonial hearsay, including nontestimonial dying declarations, 
may be exempt from Confrontation Clause analysis altogether.  Id. at 68. 
 21. Id. at 61. 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. See infra Part III.C. 
 25. Testimony dying declarations might also be an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause because the Founders understood so and the Court in 2004 
said so.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  See also infra Part 
III.D. 
4
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principles. 
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Dying Declarations Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) defines what we 
commonly refer to as a “dying declaration” as the statement of an 
unavailable declarant made under the belief of impending death: 
Statements under belief of impending death.  In a 
prosecution for a homicide or in a civil action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, 
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
declarant believed to be impending death.26
Rule 804(a) requires a finding of unavailability before 804(b)’s 
exception may be used, and for the purposes of this article we must 
assume that the unavailability at issue is the death of the declarant.  
Unless the declarant died and the ensuing prosecution of the 
defendant is for homicide,
 
27 the 804(b)(2) exception is not 
available in criminal cases.28
The constitutional question is raised when a dying declaration 
as defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) is offered against 





 26. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 27. The question of whether the homicide prosecution must be for the death 
of the declarant is beyond the scope of this article.  Suffice it to say that there are 
few decisions on this issue.  Generally, dying declarations are admissible only in 
cases of homicide where the declarant’s death is the subject of the homicide 
charge.  There are, however, state cases where the admissibility is not confined to 
situations in which the declarant’s death is at issue, but extends to any situation in 
which the circumstances of the declarant’s death is relevant to any issue.  See, e.g., 
State v. Lester, 240 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1978).  Typically, these cases present the odd 
situation where the accused is on trial for the murder of two or more persons, and 
the admissibility of a dying declaration of one of the deceased persons is at issue 
for both charges or in the trial for the homicide of the non-declarant.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Key, 407 N.E.2d 327 (Mass. 1980); State v. Harding, 230 S.E.2d 
397 (N.C. 1976). 
 28. The rule is different in civil cases; although these require the 
unavailability of the declarant, that unavailability need not be the death of the 
declarant (at least, not by the time of trial).  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 
 29.  This situation, of course, gives rise to the possibility that how the 
Founders understood dying declarations may be somewhat different from how the 
5
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B. Crawford Summary 
In 1980, the Court confronted, yet again, the question of 
whether the admission of hearsay against an accused always violates 
the Sixth Amendment or whether exceptions to the rule excluding 
hearsay are also exceptions to the Sixth Amendment.30  In 
response, the Court announced the “super-reliability” test in 
Roberts.31  The holding is, essentially, a tautology: if hearsay is 
sufficiently reliable that its admission would not violate the Sixth 
Amendment, then the Sixth Amendment is not violated by its 
admission because it is sufficiently reliable.32
 
Federal Rules of Evidence define dying declarations.  See infra Part III.  Embedded 
in this proposition is another issue: whether the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned only with testimonial hearsay or also with non-hearsay but testimonial 
statements.  In the heart of the Crawford analysis, the Court discusses the “specific 
type of out-of-court statement” about which the Sixth Amendment is concerned.  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“Various formulations of this 
core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist . . . .”) (emphasis added).  At the 
conclusion of his decision for the Court, Justice Scalia refers neither to testimonial 
hearsay nor testimonial statements, but to testimonial evidence.  Id. at 68 (“Where 
testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”) (emphasis added).  By way of example, consider the following 
scenario: a co-conspirator approaches someone he knows to be an undercover 
police officer and says: “We have some great narcotics moving through the city 
tonight.  We need some help from ‘inside.’  You interested?  You could make a lot 
of money helping us out.”  Arguably, that is a statement made during and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and, 
thus, defined as non-hearsay.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).  But it is also a 
testimonial statement in that it was “made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe . . . would be available for use at a later 
trial,” should the declarant have guessed wrongly as to the corruptibility of the 
officer.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  If Crawford is limited to testimonial “hearsay,” 
then the only issue preventing this statement from being introduced against an 
accused (assuming the declarant is unavailable) would be whether the Founders 
considered co-conspirator statements non-hearsay.  If the holding of Crawford is 
not limited to testimonial hearsay, but includes testimonial statements or testimonial 
evidence, then admission of the statement at issue here might well violate the Sixth 
Amendment.  Conjecturing potential resolutions to this issue is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
 30.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 57. 
  Put in the language of 
the case, we can say that where a declarant is unavailable, hearsay 
may be admitted without violating the Sixth Amendment if the 
relevant hearsay exception is “firmly-rooted” or, if not, that the 
relevant hearsay exception provides circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to those provided by the firmly-rooted 
6
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exceptions.33
Almost immediately, confusion arose about the meaning of the 
Court’s decision in Roberts.  For example, the unavailability 
requirement of Roberts was discarded in United States v. Inadi.
 
34  Inadi 
suggested that Roberts applied only to the facts of that case: prior 
testimony situations, where the Federal Rules of Evidence required 
unavailability as an evidentiary prerequisite to admission.35  Inadi 
itself addressed the co-conspirator situation, where a showing of 
unavailability had never been required.36  In 1987, Bourjaily seemed 
to accept that Roberts applied to all hearsay offered against an 
accused but provided the requirements of a firmly-rooted Federal 
Rules of Evidence hearsay exception were satisfied.37  If they were, 
admission would be insulated against constitutional challenge.38  
White v. Illinois39 stated that Roberts unavailability analysis is only 
required when the declarant’s statements were made in a prior 
judicial proceeding.40
Perhaps the quintessential example of the conceptual mess 
created by Roberts is Lilly v. Virginia.
 
41  The case involved statements 
against penal interest and produced no single opinion joined by a 
majority of the Justices.42
 
 33.  The “firmly-rooted” hearsay exceptions have been held to include co-
conspirator statements.  Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (“We 
think that these cases demonstrate that co-conspirators’ statements, when made in 
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being 
outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion.”).  Roberts itself dealt with 
prior testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)—a defense witness 
testified unfavorably at a preliminary hearing; when the witness proved to be 
unavailable at trial, the prosecution offered the preliminary hearing testimony 
which, of course, the defendant had had an opportunity to confront.  See Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 56.  It is interesting to note that though the Court overruled Roberts in 
Crawford, the result of Roberts would be the same under Crawford.  Idaho v. Wright 
provides an example of what is not a firmly rooted exception: Federal Rule of 
Evidence 807.  See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 805 (1990) (rejecting Idaho’s 
residual hearsay exception as firmly-rooted for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause). 
 34.  475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 35.  See id. at 400. 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 182. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 40.  Id. at 353–54. 
 41.  527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
 42.  Id. 
  Although the Court unanimously voted to 
reverse, a four-three split developed over the extent to which 
defendant-inculpatory accomplice statements may fall within a 
7
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firmly-rooted hearsay exception, and over the extent to which the 
declarant’s statements might be separated out into admissible 
inculpatory and inadmissible self-serving statements.43  Justices 
Scalia and Thomas concurred in the result, noting that the 
Confrontation Clause was only concerned with testimonial 
statements.44
Suffice it to say that the focus on testimonial statements in 
Justices Scalia and Thomas’s opinions in White and Lilly evolved 
into the majority holding in Crawford. Those opinions are rooted in 
an understanding of “1791 Theory,” and have held firm in the two 
major
 
45 post-Crawford decisions issued prior to the publication of 
this article: Davis v. Washington46 and Giles v. California.47  Justice 
Scalia wrote both opinions, and both reflect a strong originalist 
approach to constitutional decision-making.  Davis did not contain 
a dissenting opinion, though Justice Thomas concurred on even 
narrower historical grounds.48  In Giles, the majority held together 
over the 1791 understanding of forfeiture of Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights, but not without disagreement.49
III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
   
For ease in discussing the four alternative explanations for a 
Sixth Amendment exception for testimonial dying declarations 
(what we might call the praeter jus status of testimonial dying 
declarations), let us posit the following scenario: an undercover 
police officer infiltrates a gang.  His identity is discovered and he is 
murdered by the gang leader.  Suspecting something is amiss, 
other officers locate the dying undercover officer who says to them, 
recognizing them to be his colleagues in law enforcement: 
“Lieutenant, I know I’m dying.  I don’t have long.  They figured 
 
 43.  See id. at 120. 
 44.  See id. at 143 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring). 
 45.  There are two Crawford retroactivity cases, both of which fall outside the 
issues discussed in this article.  See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008); 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
 46.  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 47.  128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).  On November 10, 2008, the Court heard 
arguments in another confrontation case.  The decision in that case is still 
pending.  See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). 
 48.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 49.  Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688, 2691–93.  See also id. at 2695 (Souter, J., 
concurring, joined by Ginsberg, J.); id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stevens and Kennedy, JJ.) 
8
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out who I was and the gang leader shot me.  I hope you catch the 
son-of-a-bitch.  He’s probably headed to his girlfriend’s house at 
101 West Main Street.  The gun he used is a thirty-eight caliber 
Beretta with a pearl handle.”  Whereupon the officer expires.  The 
gang leader is apprehended at his girlfriend’s house and 
prosecuted for the murder of the undercover officer.  At the time 
of the suspect’s arrest, he is in possession of a thirty-eight caliber 
Beretta with a pearl handle. 
A. Dying Declarations Are So Reliable That the Sixth Amendment’s 
Concern for the Reliability of Evidence Is Not Raised 
A review of common law sources would seem to support the 
proposition that dying declarations are so reliable that the Sixth 
Amendment is not offended by their admission against an accused.  
For example, in Rex v. Woodcock,50
Now the general principle on which [dying declarations 
are] admitted is, that they are declarations made in 
extremity, when the party is at the point of death,
 the court stated that 
51 and 
when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive 
to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the 
most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a 
situation so solemn, and so awful, is considered by the law 
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by 
a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice.52
The problem with the Supreme Court accepting this 




 50.  Rex v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (L.R.C.C.R.).   
 51.  Canon law made a distinction between “in the moment of death” (in 
articulo mortis) and “in danger of death” (in periculo mortis).  See JAMES T. BRETZKE, 
CONSECRATED PHRASES: A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY 61–64 (2003).  In articulo 
mortis “[r]efers to the imminent danger of death (usually due to illness or serious 
injury).”  Id. at 61.  In periculo mortis had “an important legal distinction in that it 
applies not only to those who are physically near death but also includes those 
who, due to circumstances like war or natural disasters, might also be in some 
danger of death.”  Id. at 64. 
 52. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
 53.  In the oral argument for Giles v. California, Justice Scalia suggested that 
dying declarations are simply outside Sixth Amendment boundaries because of 
their reliability. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *12–13, Giles v. Washington, 
128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 1803647 (“And the evidence of 
truthfulness [of a dying declaration] was apparently that the person was about to 
enter the next world . . . [a]nd most of us don’t lie at that particular moment. 
Whereas, in the Confrontation Clause situation you have a totally different 
situation.”). 
 is that it would 
9
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signal a return to Ohio v. Roberts, something the Court has been 
clear it does not intend to do.54
Considering our scenario, if a court can find as a matter of fact 
(by, for example, a preponderance of the evidence, a standard 
often applied by the Court to preliminary finding of fact on 
evidentiary rulings when it concludes it should articulate a standard 
at all)
 
55 that all of the dying officer’s statements are “statement[s] 
made . . . while believing that . . . death was imminent, concerning 
the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be 
impending death,”56
In short, Justice Scalia has risked painting himself into the 
proverbial corner by mentioning that dying declarations are sui 
generis exceptions to the Sixth Amendment.
 then it should be “super-reliable” and 
admissible.  The Court could have made this ruling under Roberts, 
especially if this represented the common law’s approach to dying 
declarations.  But if Roberts is no longer available for consideration, 
then the Crawford Court would likely deny certiorari, if the “super-
reliability” theory was the reason the Founders would have 




 54. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (“We decline to approve an exception to 
the Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the founding or for 200 years 
thereafter.”).  Justice Scalia has also put a fine point on this during oral 
arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *11, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-
6053), 2008 WL 1803647 (Scalia, J.) (“But we did say that the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause is the meaning it bore when the people adopted it.”); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at *23, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, (No. 07-
591), 2008 WL 4892843 (Scalia, J.) (“I am interested in the history since that’s 
what the Court held in Crawford, that the content of the Confrontation Clause is 
not what we would like it to be, but what it historically was when it was enshrined 
in the Constitution.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (“We are . . . 
guided by our prior decisions regarding admissibility determinations that hinge on 
preliminary factual questions.  We have traditionally required that these matters 
be established by a preponderance of proof.”). 
 56.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 57.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
  If the exception rests 
on an understanding that dying declarations are “super-reliable,” 
then—testimonial or not—this exception would seem to be more 
in line with the reasoning of Roberts than with Crawford.  Or is there 
another reason why this exception exists, if it does? 
10
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B. Dying Declarations Are Self-Confronted 
Is it possible that dying declarations may have been considered 
self-confronted? That is to say, because the dying person was about 
to meet his (or her) maker, that him-(or her-) self (or The Maker 
Him-, Her-, or Itself) would in effect be the confrontational 
presence testing the truth of the dying person’s declarations.  The 
cultural normative concerns about such a less secular super-
reliability thesis aside,58 if this were the case the Court would hardly 
refer to dying declarations as “exceptions” to the Sixth 
Amendment.  They would, in effect, be subject to the Sixth 
Amendment.  And as it is not the defendant who is doing the 
confronting,59 this argument (if it rises to the level of an argument) 
is but an alternate way of ensuring reliability,  not by testing in the 
“crucible of cross-examination,”60
C. No Dying Declaration Can Be Testimonial 
 but by testing in the crucible of 
death and the afterlife. 
The entire statement in our scenario would likely pass such a 
bare “statement made at the moment of death” test.  Even if this 
were the Founders’ understanding, it would seem to gut Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) of any particular meaning and, for that 
reason alone, would not be a likely resolution to the question of 
why dying declarations might be exceptions to the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Footnote six in Crawford begs this question because it refers 
explicitly to testimonial dying declarations.61
 
 58.  If the Constitution entrenches relevant common law provisions, see 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (“Our Constitution and the 
common-law traditions it entrenches . . . .”), what does that mean?  If dying 
declarations, as understood by the Founders, were recognized as an exception to 
the Sixth Amendment because of the accepted religious beliefs of the time, are 
those beliefs “entrenched,” i.e., normative, today, or does an empty formalism 
merely provide an arbitrary rule of evidence? 
 59.  In his oral argument in Melendez-Diaz, Jeffrey Fisher suggested that the 
relevant issue was whether the defendant, not someone else, is confronting the 
witness.  Transcript of Oral Argument at *17, Melendez-Diaz, (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 
4892843. “It’s, again, for the defendant to decide and not for the court to decide 
whether cross-examination would be useful.”  Id. 
 60.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 61.  Id. at 56 n.6 (“The one deviation we have found involves dying 
declarations.”). 
  Nevertheless, could 
that reference be inaccurate?  Might dying declarations as 
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understood by the Founders exclude testimonial statements? 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2), the undercover 
officer’s statement in our hypothetical scenario arguably qualifies 
as a dying declaration.  Assuming the veracity of the officer (that he 
sincerely apprehends his imminent death), the officer’s statement 
that he knows his death is imminent and that on being discovered 
to be a police officer, the gang leader shot him with a pearl 
handled thirty-eight caliber Beretta, would qualify as a statement 
“made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was 
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
declarant believed to be impending death.”62
But would that have been considered a dying declaration by 
the Founders, for whom dying declarations focused not on revenge 
or apprehension of wrongdoers, but on the overwhelming fact of 
the awareness that one was dying?  These were statements made not 
just in danger of death (in periculo mortis), but at the point of death 
(in articulo mortis), and it was death, not some other altruistic 
concern, that caused the mind to be “induced by the most powerful 
considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so 
awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to 




If a distinction between non-testimonial and testimonial dying 
declarations can be made, between evidentiary dying declarations 
and Sixth Amendment dying declarations respectively, then we 
would be able to say that footnote six in Crawford
 
64 is inaccurate.  To 
the extent a dying declaration is non-testimonial, it would pose no 
Sixth Amendment concern, but to the extent it was testimonial, 
then it would not be acceptable under Crawford.65
But this is not to identify a partial exception to the Sixth 
Amendment.  It is, rather, to note the obvious: that non-testimonial 
dying declarations present no constitutional issues.  “Where 
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
 
 
 62.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).  Out of an abundance of caution and consistent 
with the purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the trial court should redact the 
declarant’s wish and inference that the gang leader be apprehended at the 
girlfriend’s house. 
 63.  R v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (L.R.C.C.R.). 
 64.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
 65.  Because, following Giles, the Court would have to “decline to approve an 
exception to the Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the founding or 
for 200 years thereafter.”  Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008). 
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Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development 
of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that 
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether.”66
Addressing our scenario, a critical fact issue would arise for the 
trial court: whether the dying officer’s statement was made in 
contemplation of death or in contemplation of prosecution.  If the 
former, it would be a non-testimonial and admissible hearsay 
statement; if the latter, it would be a testimonial and therefore 
inadmissible hearsay statement.  If it is possible that the statement 
might be made both in contemplation of death and in the hope of 
a successful prosecution, then further questions arise: to what 
extent is it one or the other?  To what extent would the Founders 
have understood a dying declaration to be made in the hope of a 
criminal prosecution and still be a statement made “when every 
hope of this world is gone[?]”
  Under this approach, testimonial dying declarations 
would no more be exempt from Sixth Amendment testing that any 
other testimonial hearsay. 
67
D. Dying Declarations Do Not Present Sixth Amendment Problems Because 
the Founders Said (or Understood) So 
The fourth approach to the question of whether dying 
declarations are sui generis exceptions to the Sixth Amendment is 
simply this: dying declarations, like death, are different.  For 
whatever reason they did so, the Founders accepted the fact that 
dying declarations were not subject to “testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination,” and therefore, we likewise do not subject them 
to cross-examination. 
 
That is to say, it is possible that the Court today could rule that 
dying declarations are sui generis exceptions to the Sixth 
Amendment simply because the Founders would have understood 
dying declarations to be exceptions to the Sixth Amendment, and 
not to inquire into why that might be so.  This would avoid a 
problem hinted at earlier, whether the cultural reasons for the 
Founders’ acceptance of dying declarations might be rooted in the 
religious understanding of the time (which is undoubtedly 
reflected in the common law tradition).68
 
 66.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 67.  Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
 68.  See, e.g., supra Part III.B.     
  Because the common law 
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tradition known in 1791 is “entrenched by our constitution,”69
IV. CONCLUSION 
 an 
argument suggests itself that the cultural norms existing in 1791 
remain, as a constitutional matter, cultural norms today. 
In short, a ruling on the evidentiary and constitutional 
questions raised by our scenario might be as follows: should a trial 
court find that the evidentiary predicate for 804(b)(2) admission 
exists as a matter of fact, then the Sixth Amendment would pose no 
barrier to the admission of the dying declaration because the 
Founders would have likewise barred their admission, and no 
further explanation is necessary. 
We have raised the question as to why dying declarations might 
be understood to be, as the Court suggests, sui generis exceptions to 
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.  We have summarized 
the shift in jurisprudence from super-reliability to cross-
examination as the test for the constitutionally acceptable 
admission of testimonial hearsay against homicide defendants.  We 
have looked at four possible approaches to the praeter jus status of 
dying declarations, and we see that the problem of dying 
declarations and the Sixth Amendment highlights a fundamental 
weakness of Justice Scalia’s “1791 jurisprudence.”  The weakness is 
also at its strength: it is over-simple in a complex and pluralistic, 
multi-cultural society.  However simple it makes the task of 
constitutional interpretation, it cannot make the world simple 
merely by demanding it be so.70
 
 69.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (“Our Constitution and 
the common-law traditions it entrenches . . .”). 
 
 69.   Justice Scalia’s Crawford-based jurisprudence may, however, signal a 
return to the jurisprudence of dissent primarily authored by Justices Stephens, 
Marshall, Brennan, and sometimes, Blackmun.  See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 
(1986) (“This case poses fundamental questions about our system of justice.  As 
this Court has long recognized, and reaffirmed only weeks ago, ‘ours is an 
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.’”).    Id. at 434 (Stephens, J., 
dissenting); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 
(“[I]t is unseemly and unjust for the Government to beggar those it prosecutes in 
order to disable their defense at trial.”) Id. at 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
Crawford and its progeny recognize the centrality of the defense lawyer in an 
accusatorial, adversarial system.  “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to 
ensure the reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner, by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”)  
541 U.S. at 61–62.  See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
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So we end where we began: with an observation and a 
question: dying declarations may, like grey-eyed Athena springing 
fully armed from the head of Zeus,71 be self-generating, and also 
like Athena may be outside the Sixth Amendment.72  In Athena’s 
case, we likely know the answer why.  In the case of dying 
declarations, the question remains.  Why?73
 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”)  Id. at 596.     
 71.  HESIOD, THEOGONY 924 (Apostolos Athanassakis trans., Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1983). 
 72.  However significant the acts of the gods may be in other disciplines, they 
are irrelevant to questions of constitutional law. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 170 (1986) (holding Miranda protects defendants’ rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, and does not go any further). 
 
 73.  On April 7, 2008, the Kenosha County (Wisconsin) Circuit Court issued 
an opinion in State v. Jensen, discussing whether, under Crawford, a letter 
containing testimonial hearsay, written November 21, 1998, could be admitted as a 
dying declaration in a prosecution for a homicide committed on December 3, 
1998.  727 N.W.2d 518, 529 (Wis. 2007) (holding that the letter was written, given 
to a neighbor to be delivered to specific police officers in the event of the 
declarant’s death and, according to the Kenosha County Circuit Court, “ratified” 
by not having been withdrawn by the victim.)  Seeming to confuse the evidentiary 
issue with the constitutional issue, the court determined that this “timed letter . . . 
must be analyzed not by the flawed imminence-focused rule of the modern era, 
but in the light of the common law rule which existed at the time that the Framers 
adopted the Sixth Amendment.”  State v. Jensen, 02-CF-0314 at 16 (Kenosha Cty. 
Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2008) (unpublished, http://www.personal. umich.edu/ 
~rdfrdman/JensenDyingDec.pdf) (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).  That common law 
rule was rooted in a medieval English understanding of religion and the medieval 
maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri (no one who is dying is presumed to lie).  
That is to say, the present Wisconsin evidentiary rule, which requires temporal and 
subject matter links between the declaration and the dying (“[a] statement made 
by the declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, 
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the 
declarant’s impending death.”) should nonetheless be understood according to 
the common law in 1791.  WIS. STAT. ANN. 908.045(3) (West 2000).  But there is 
nothing in Crawford that requires this.  What Crawford requires is not that the 
evidentiary rule but that the Sixth Amendment be understood as it was in 1791.  
Thus, it is probable that some dying declarations might pass constitutional muster 
only to be excluded because of the requirements of the relevant rules of evidence.  
The Sixth Amendment issue arises after a court has found a testimonial hearsay 
statement admissible as a matter of evidentiary law, not before.  But the Kenosha 
County Circuit Court is adamant that the common law rule in existence in 1791 
controls both the constitutional and evidentiary issues, regardless of the current 
understanding of the premises on which it rests.  The court thus ignores another 
medieval maxim: cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex (the reason for the law having 
ceased, so also the law ceases).  The court states: “Crawford teaches that in 
analyzing the extent of the Confrontation Clause, a court must look to the 
[evidence] Rule as it existed in 1791, not to how it has eroded to its present form.”  
Jenson at 10–11, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rdfrdman/ 
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Might it be that, over two hundred years since the ratification 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Anglo-American tradition still finds—




JensenDyingDec.pdf.  By failing to distinguish the evidentiary rule from the 
constitutional principle, the Wisconsin court effectively held (1) that dying 
declarations in Wisconsin in 2008 should be understood in light of the medieval 
maxim that a dying person is presumed not to lie, and (2) that dying declarations 
are exceptions to the Confrontation Clause because the Founders said so, 
regardless of why they said so. Because of the important role dying declarations 
play in many homicide prosecutions, especially domestic violence homicides, it 
may take yet another Supreme Court confrontation decision before we gain a 
meaningful understanding of dying declarations then and now, and their 
relationship to the Sixth Amendment.  Without understanding the relationship of 
dying declarations at common law to dying declarations today, and of both to the 
Sixth Amendment, rulings such as the Kenosha County ruling in Jensen amount to 
little more than judicial fiat. 
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